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Deborah James
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ABSTRACT
Kenya and South Africa are two settings in which the upwardly-
aspiring ‘new middle class’ has been particularly noted: its
members desire to transcend the hierarchies and inequalities that
once kept some from achieving prosperity. Based on research in
South Africa, this article goes beyond a focus on narrowly
economic aspects of this class to explore the role of the
Pentecostal or neo-charismatic churches in articulating and
(re)shaping its subjective values and orientations. Alongside
expectations of abundant wealth, these churches aﬃrm the
positive qualities that work can endow, a capitalist-style interest in
property investment, an inculcation of rational subdivision and
allocation of one’s income to diverse ends, and a redistributive
approach to economic arrangements. At the same time, church
membership allows for self-reﬂection and critical citizenship:
congregants have a nuanced self-awareness of the way in which
their new status separates them from those with fewer privileges
and less access to the beneﬁts of modernity, and are able to
deliberate reﬂexively about the character of these privileges.
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Across much of Africa, and indeed across the Global South, the new middle class is said to
be on the rise (Cohen 2004; Fuller & Narasimhan 2014; Neri 2012; Zhang 2008), even as in
EuroAmerica – paradoxically – its older counterpart is said to be declining (Newman 1999;
Sassen 2014). Some are sceptical about its reported growth in these settings, questioning
the World Bank’s inclusion of those earning US$1 to US$2 a day and suggesting that these
new delineations are motivated solely by the proﬁts that arise from new forms of ﬁnancial
inclusion (Cheeseman 2015; Spronk 2014); or claiming that the putative growth of this
class can be explained by the extension of consumer credit to those formerly denied it
(De Oliveira 2012; James 2015; Yaccoub 2011).
Kenya and South Africa are two settings in which the emergence of this ‘new class’ has
been particularly noted – but also debated and even disputed (Cheeseman 2015; Scharrer,
O’Kane & Kroeker 2018; Southall 2016). Critics have posited, for the Kenyan case, that its
precarious character may leave members vulnerable to downward mobility (Kroeker
2018) and will likely preclude their engaging in more serious and public-minded activities
© 2018 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
CONTACT Deborah James d.a.james@lse.ac.uk
This article has been republished with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.
AFRICAN STUDIES
https://doi.org/10.1080/00020184.2018.1540516
which might make them the bedrock of political stability in newly-stabilising democracies
(Cheeseman 2015). But others point out, for the South African one, that to focus only on
the precarious character of this class can obscure its important social and political roles:
roles embodying inventively novel self-identiﬁcations – and ‘transformative social poten-
tials’ (Nuttall 2004; Mbembe 2004) – which may be predicated on the conﬁdence that
comes with new patterns of aspiration, consumption, work and education (Chevalier
2015; Mercer 2014; O’Dougherty 2002; Spronk 2014). (The recent ‘Feesmustfall’movement
calling for an end to student debt in South Africa shows that being indebted may, in turn,
empower a new generation of activists.)
However shaky the basis of this putative class, upward mobility and inclusivity is experi-
enced in vivid ways: a study in Soweto showed that ‘everyone is now’ – or considers herself
now to be – ‘middle class’ (Phadi & Ceruti 2011). Or, at least, many are now engaged in that
upward identiﬁcation that Ivor Chipkin (2013), for SouthAfrica, calls ‘middle classing’, or that
Rachel Spronk, for Kenya (2014), typiﬁes as involving the new subjectivities of ‘middle class-
ness’. Underpinning this is a desire to transcend the hierarchies and inequalities that once
kept some from achieving prosperity (James 2015; Servet & Saiag 2013). It is also strongly
linked to the process of democratisation. While the mission-educated elite in South
Africa was of long standing, the ranks of its more recent incarnation, the new black
middle class, were massively swelled after the dawning of democracy in 1994, when
many of the previously disenfranchised were included in an expanding civil service,
became employees in state-owned enterprises, or – in fewer cases – enjoyed the
beneﬁts of public procurement tenders oﬀered in the name of Black Economic Empower-
ment (BEE) or aﬃrmative action (Southall 2012 & 2016). The growth of this class, whose
members hail from a variety of regions and ethnic backgrounds, has thus been closely
tied to the fact of state employment and support, particularly during the years of the
Mbeki government when there was an explicit attempt to foster that growth (Hart 2005;
Iheduru 2004; James 2015: 3; Krige 2009; Southall 2016: 47, 88 & 128). Its members’ reliance
on state patronage has been underplayed by the strong and much-repeated neoliberal
mantra that it is people’s responsibility to earn a living through their own individual initiat-
ive and enterprise (Krige 2012; Marais 2011: 223) and become productive members of
society without relying on connections or clientelist patronage. In Kenya, this story was
somewhat echoed, with a mission-educated elite in colonial times giving way, in the post-
colonial period, to a new middle class which has grown with similar rapidity.1 But the
Kenyan version of state patronage diﬀers from the South African one: while government
employees have been similarly implicated in schemes of enrichment related to government
tenders (Wrong 2010: 78, 85–6 & 171), chains of clientelism have been closely tied to ethnic
background, with each successive regime doling out state sector jobs to those from the
same area/linguistic group (Wrong 2010: 52, 56, 116 & 126), and with these ties often
linked to pro- or anti-authoritarian political aﬃliations respectively (Cheeseman 2015: 655).2
Whatever the material underpinnings of this rapidly growing social stratum –whether it
is self-sustaining, unduly reliant on the state for its survival, or inclined to borrow exces-
sively from its own future to invest in the present (Peebles 2010: 226), or all three – analysis
in both countries has often focused on narrowly economic aspects of its existence. In
South Africa, some are anxious about the indebtedness and precarity of its members
(Daniels 2004: 842, see James 2015: 3 & 11–2).3 In Kenya, analysts question whether its
members are able to espouse middle-class political cosmopolitanism with suﬃcient
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vigour as to behave ‘civically’ and hence prove themselves ‘more resistant to divide and
rule politics than the average citizen’ (Cheeseman 2015: 655 & 648). This article is con-
cerned with the way in which these questions of sustainability and engaged citizenship
are linked to the ‘modern self-perceptions’ (Spronk 2014: 99) and ‘hopes, desires and sat-
isfactions’ (Moore 2011: 27) of this emerging social stratum. One arena in which this new
value orientation takes place, and in which the subjective orientations of the new middle
class are expressed and reshaped, is via the Pentecostal or neo-charismatic churches.
‘The key to the new middle classes is the Bible churches’, I was told by an informant.
Because hope and its cognate, aspiration, are both forward-looking modalities, and
because they are linked both to collective notions of the good life and to individual
agency, those embracing new modes of social being – and simultaneously seeking to dis-
tinguish themselves from those who are not doing so –will be particularly inclined to plant
themselves within social milieus and communities that oﬀer guidance on how to live a
future-oriented life (Freeman 2012; Moore 2011: 138–8 & 145). My research revealed
that there was more to this ‘key’ than vague-sounding and feel-good ideas about orienting
oneself as an individual to a new world of expectation. Ideas about collective action, critical
citizenship and ﬁnancial acumen also came into play. These churches – in a setting of neo-
liberal late modernity in which sovereign authorities have waned in signiﬁcance and the
market is predominant – oﬀer new visions of citizenship and belonging beyond those nor-
mally facilitated by secular government-style bodies (Comaroﬀ 2012). Thus, ‘shifts in forms
of subjectiﬁcation’ may be ‘linked to emergent publics and new forms of sociality’ (Moore
2011: 145), and may simultaneously enable self-aware recognition of how their new status
has been facilitated.
The ﬁrst-hand research for this article was conducted in South Africa, but in line with the
topic of this thematic section I oﬀer some comparative insights drawn from literature on
Kenya. Although my ﬁeldwork did not focus on neo-charismatic churches per se, my
focus on aspiration and upward mobility led me inevitably to explore them. Given that
the ranks of those who aspire to join the new middle class far outnumber those who
have succeeded in doing so, my interview-based research and participant observation
extended across a range of settings. Accompanying my research interlocutors – from
medium- to well-paid employees of the government and of universities based in Johannes-
burg and Pretoria to university students and their low- to middle-income wage earners in
the Sunview neighbourhood of Soweto – to the range of churches they attended, I spoke to
congregants and pastors in all of these.4 They included the bigger andwealthier Grace Bible
Churchwith its huge Soweto headquarters and parking lots ﬁlledwith up-market cars, more
modest churcheswith predominantly student and young professionalmembers such as His
People, which operated from the premises of a cinema, and the even smaller Living Word
International Church whose members met in a marquee on a vacant Soweto lot.5 While
these might appear so diverse as to have little in common, what their members shared
was marking themselves oﬀ from the longer-established and sometimes more mainstream
churches in which they had grown up and which their parents had attended. They all fell
within the broad category of ‘neo-charismatic’ (Anderson 2004) – as distinct both from
‘mainstream’mission churches and earlier evangelical-style churches such as the Apostolic
Faith Mission (James 1987; Thompson 1993, cited in Van Wyk 2014). What linked these
diverse congregations was their consumption of CD sermons – readily and widely available
for sale across the board – by each other’s pastors (see Hirschkind 2006).
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My interlocutor’s claim that the Bible or neo-charismatic churches are ‘the key to the
middle classes’ is echoed in the literature (Frahm-Arp 2010), and similar links between
class aspiration and Pentecostal aﬃliation has been noted elsewhere in Africa besides
the two settings under consideration here (for example Meyer 2004; Van de Kamp
2012). Anticipating the arrival of democracy and the upward mobility and prosperity
that was intended to accompany it, policy-makers in South Africa started to explore the
role of these churches in the 1990s and early 2000s. Researchers at the Centre for Devel-
opment Enterprise (CDE), formerly the Urban Foundation, made eﬀorts to explore the
ethical or ideological features that might nurture this new class and give it succour.
They took inspiration from the broadly Weberian approach of Peter Berger, who had
seen such churches as enabling the development of rationally calculative modernity
and economic growth, and also explored their potential as models of democratic organ-
isation, accountability and political responsiveness (Bernstein 2008; Bernstein & Rule 2011:
124–5; Schlemmer 2008).6
For those seeking new forms of citizenship and identiﬁcation, and looking to create
separate redistributive worlds of taxation and welfare (Bähre 2011) while simultaneously
inducing expectations, in line with neoliberalism and market-oriented excess, of miracu-
lous return, these churches may provide a signiﬁcant vehicle of values, orientations and
dispositions – both implanting and expressing these. Although they appear to orient
themselves away from the world of public political engagement and engagement with
the state, as Jean Comaroﬀ (2012) suggests, they also – as she similarly notes and com-
mensurate with what the policy authors maintain (Bernstein & Rule 2011) – provide a
language of engaged citizenship, framed consciously and in a self-reﬂexive manner,
that is otherwise diﬃcult to articulate in the wider domain.
Abundance, calculation and redistribution
Neo-charismatic churches have often appeared to be overly concerned with money.
Accounts of their ‘prosperity gospel’ have drawn attention to the quasi-gift economy
these churches instantiate by insisting that their congregants pay generously – that is,
tithe – into church coﬀers (Zaloom 2016; Bähre 2011; Van Wyk 2014), in what has been
called a ‘miracle seeding’ approach. Qualifying the quasi-magical focus of such accounts,
others indicate that the money is used for this-worldly purposes. Tithing can be seen as
underpinning the creation of an autonomous community with its own welfare system,
and as inculcating notions of self-control, planning one’s money, and saving (Bernstein
& Rule 2011; Freeman 2012; Comaroﬀ 2012; Zaloom 2016). Erik Bähre (2011) shows that
these churches share something with social grants and insurances: much like the state,
but also in its place, they collect and then facilitate the redistribution of income.
These churches also lay a strong emphasis on self-help while encompassing the needs
of the less well-oﬀ. Echoing a theme common in my own interviews, a pastor in one
Soweto church outlined the contributions made by his church to congregants’ school
and university fees, their outreach activities with those suﬀering from HIV/AIDS, and
their help to the poor (Bernstein & Rule 2011). Less concrete, and more focused on
the attempted shaping of subjectivities, several accounts draw attention to the fact
that tithing – which might on the face of it seem irrationally exorbitant – goes along
with a measured and planned approach to using money. It entails calculation. There
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is, as Laurence Schlemmer of CDE noted, a kind of quasi-Calvinist pattern of deferred
gratiﬁcation: ‘ … don’t spend all your money now. Rather, invest it wisely. Marshal
your energies so that you can do things better and have more eﬀect’. Tithing, he
observed, acts as a ‘spiritual investment’ but also provides ‘ … a model of saving in
other respects’; a format for thinking about ‘putting money aside for larger purposes,
for constructive purposes’ (2008: n.p.).
The insistence placed by such policy-makers on the churches’ ﬁnancial rationality of
course reﬂects their interest in ﬁnding evidence of a ‘Protestant ethic’ rather than of
more magical/aﬀective ones. It is borne out by statements from some informants, who
were aware of the negative perceptions of these churches’ ‘miracle seeding’ aspect but
chose instead to highlight values of thrift and budgeting. A young member of His
People Church in Pretoria stressed this:
Good stewardship is key. One must tithe, one cannot just spend as one wants to. With men-
toring programmes, older men mentor younger ones, giving them advice on how to use
money, etc. There are lots of programmes relating to ﬁnance and the like.
Although I was unable to ascertain whether members routinely contributed a tenth of
their income, a statement by another member suggests that their donations were substan-
tial: he said one would need to be a professional and a high earner to aﬀord the tithes, and
he himself paid his contributions by debit order.7
A concern with world-centred saving and ﬁscal discipline was echoed by church
pastors. Rethabile Matome is part of a husband-and-wife pastor team in the Living
Word International Church as well as working in the banking industry. The church, she
told me, seeks to tackle problems of indebtedness. A sage and rational approach to per-
sonal savings and investment – as in her own case – can dovetail with rather than contra-
dict a concern with the communal good of the congregation:
… as a minister, I have a couple of ways I combine – I have more than one property, and sec-
ondly I have some savings which I invest in. I try not to spend more than 70% of my income on
myself. I share, and spread the rest to the church, and on my savings and investments…
Decrying the broader lack of ﬁnancial education (see Ndumo 2011; Zaloom 2016), she
speaks of the need to ‘structure your income in a way that you will come always out
earning more’. Having people do so, she says, will beneﬁt both themselves and ‘us’ –
the church:
… There’s a lot of development we would like to do. If you are not ﬁnancially strong you will
not be able to assist as you would like to do. So teaching people about ﬁnance and how to
take care of their ﬁnances becomes an advantage to us as well – so that we can continue
to do the things we are able to do.
One destination for such investments is ﬁxed property. In preference to holding meet-
ings in marquees, cinemas, and the like, many churches aim at saving money in order to
secure their own premises. At a meeting of the His People Church in Pretoria, held in a
theatre, the treasurer used graphs and PowerPoints in his yearly ﬁnancial statement to
show how close the congregation was to reaching its goal of buying a city apartment
building which would serve as a headquarters, and in which members might reside as a
close community or generate income by renting it out. In the far humbler Living Word
Church, which met in a marquee on an empty plot in Sunview, Soweto, its pastor enjoined
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congregants to help meet the savings target of R60,000 so they too could move into more
permanent premises.
If church members aim to practise such forms of ﬁscal discipline, do the pastors who
advocate this use similar rhetoric in their sermons? At ﬁrst glance these seem to speak
of the expectation of receiving in abundant return based on faith alone, and scornfully
to repudiate the more worldly approach in which educational qualiﬁcations, a good job,
and a salary are relied upon. In a sermon distributed on CD, Rethabile’s husband Pastor
Matome outlines the ‘two ﬁnancial systems’. There is the ‘world’s system’ of poverty
and ‘not enough’, and ‘God’s system’ of ‘more than enough’. The latter, to which he
encourages his congregants to ‘switch’, is based, he says, in a prelapsarian world, before
Adam was condemned to live ‘by the sweat of his brow’, and will instead distribute the
beneﬁts of harvest without toil.
The expectation of future plenty is vividly evoked. Seemingly paradoxically, however,
this discourse is interspersed with language drawn from banking. In a ‘Financial
Seminar’ that is likewise available on CD, Pastor Mohau Rammile of the Global Reconcilia-
tion Church in Bloemfontein, Free State Province, speaks of ‘the Lord’s standing order for
your life’. It is like ‘a debit order… it must go at the end of the month – the bank must obey
your instructions… the moment you sign, from this account to that account’. He goes on
to use further imagery from the world of ﬁnance:
The standing order is a debt that God owes you… He was forced to make a statement of debt
– sekôlôtô… From tonight, when you pray, you are going to invoke a standing order. Look at
that house. That furniture. That car. Say ‘tomorrow I am going to drive you’.
As the pastor gets more excited, he speaks with greater passion:
In your business, in your studies. God has unﬁnished business with you. There is an outstand-
ing amount of money coming your way. There is an outstanding amount of cars, and mar-
riages, and relationships. God is going to settle some scores with the devil in your life. We
are reversing every curse, we speak restoration of everything that has been taken from you.
I decree ﬁnances, not just a six ﬁgure, but a seven ﬁgure. I force it upon your spirit, upon
your life and family.
In this ‘Financial Seminar’, imminent good fortune arises without congregants needing to
take any practical steps.
But underlying these millenarian expectations of abundant harvest is a trenchant cri-
tique of the new order, at both global and national scales. Pastor Matome, Rethabile’s
husband who, like his wife, is employed in a bank, had an acute awareness of the weak-
nesses of the global ﬁnancial system. If we turn back to his CD sermon on the ‘two ﬁnancial
systems’, we can see that he deploys these skilfully to strengthen the message that only
‘God’s system’ is enduring. Countering a statement by an imaginary protagonist, who says
‘No, I’m not poor, I’ve got R30,000 in the bank,’ the pastor emphasises:
You cannot bank on your bank. Just because your bank has never gone broke, you think it’s
not possible.…Who has studied economics here? If you study economics you will realise this
whole system is a gamble. Nobody knows when it will break down. They are riding on it as
long as it lasts, until it breaks down. That’s what happened in America. South Africa didn’t
tell you, if the bank goes bankrupt youmight lose your money. If Standard Bank says ‘I’mbank-
rupt’ and you say ‘you owe me’, how can they pay you if they are bankrupt?
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He expands his critique of the ‘world’s system’ to encompass those who think they have
beneﬁted from it, but remain in bondage.
Right now, less than ten per cent of the world holds the riches of all the world. The business
world keeps you stupid, earn a stupid degree, do a stupid job, for a rich guy.
Speaking in apparent repudiation of the accomplishments and practices of his congre-
gants, many of whom although of humble means are studying at university or paying
for their children to do so, he says:
I want to dash this degree thing. People think it’s the hope of the world. ‘Man, you must get a
degree.’ Get a degree if you want. But get a degree with a smarter mind. The business world
says ‘we need engineers’, so they promote engineering at university. Who needs them? The
rich guys. We are short of scientists. Who needs scientists? The rich guys.
He nevertheless assures his congregants that he is not recommending they skip work. Like
him, they will be going back to their day jobs on Monday morning. Indeed, he speaks with
approval of the empowering character of work, and in doing so disparages the high levels
of unemployment:
People are sitting at home because they are waiting for jobs for money. Work gives you
beneﬁts, you have a positive mind, you wake up early. When you work, there are other
beneﬁts than money. When a person has no work, he frustrates his woman, frustrates the
whole family.
He then slips seamlessly into a condemnation of the circumstances of those who
have beneﬁted unduly from the government’s BEE strategies, in which privileges have
been doled out to those with connections while leaving many in their wake without
equivalent advantages. He speaks scornfully of the BMWs, DSTV subscriptions, and
other outward and visible signs of wealth much-beloved of those in this world of the
new middle class, while also criticising the fact that these are the fruits of nepotistic
‘aﬃrmative action’:
Have you ever seen someone throwing food to hungry dogs? People are ﬁghting for this cake,
ﬁghting to bring in their cousins and their uncles, ﬁghting to bring in their friends?
Completing the impression that his sermon represents a strong critique of the post-
1994 South African social order, with its disparaging references to ‘the rich guys’, he
draws on a section of the Old Testament that has long been a favourite with church
pastors ministering to South Africa’s dispossessed. The episode concerning the slavery
of the Israelites at the hands of the Egyptians, commonly invoked in defence of belea-
guered and oppressed people (Genovese 1976), condemns the undue beneﬁts that
accrued to the slavemaster and holds out the promise of restitution (James with Nkadi-
meng 2003; James 2003). Having stored ‘the riches for the righteous in the hands of the
wicked… God promises he will restore them to us’. Evoking the same episode, Bloemfon-
tein pastor Mohau Rammile, in his CD sermon, intones:
Your descendants will be strangers in a foreign land; they will be slaves there and will be
treated cruelly for 400 years. But I will punish the nation that enslaves them, and when
they leave that foreign land, they will take great wealth with them.
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Mixed in alongside multiple references to wealth, consumption, and proﬂigacy, these
evocative images engage in complex ways with the aspirations and desires of upwardly
mobile people – and with the conﬂicts these entail. Pastors speak with admiration of
those who get rich quick, yet they express profound mistrust in banks and politicians,
aware that the roof might come down at any time. They also scorn those who succeed
too easily. (Although it is certainly the case that some pastors in the bigger and more pros-
perous churches themselves engage in the forms of excess they criticise, Pastor Matome
and his wife, presiding over a small and modest church housed in a marquee, repudiated
such behaviour. Despite undoubtedly belonging to the ‘new black middle class’ and resid-
ing in the suburbs rather than the township, the way they combined their day jobs in the
banking industry with an after-hours commitment to their congregants suggested a rela-
tively modest rather than opulent lifestyle.)
The discourse and practice of these churches thus combines several features which
might at ﬁrst sight seem contradictory. Supporting the analysis of these churches as
quasi-magical in their orientation, there is an expectation of abundant wealth that trans-
cends and arises beyond this world’s preoccupation with monthly payment. But they also
encourage a more classically ‘Protestant ethic’ and aﬃrm the positive qualities that work
can endow, a capitalist-style interest in property investment, and an inculcation of rational
subdivision and allocation of one’s income to diverse ends. In addition, they epitomise
South Africa’s new redistributive approach to economic arrangements, and ‘oﬀer
members what amounts to alternative citizenship’ (Comaroﬀ 2012), by stressing the
importance of securing an internally coherent system of taxation and redistribution
(Bähre 2011).
But alongside these there is also a biting commentary on the rising inequalities of
21st-century South African life and a critical allusion to the role of state patronage in
putting this in place. It is this latter feature that will be pursued in the following section.
Whatever role these churches play in fostering the entrepreneurial mind-set that goes
with the emergence of a middle class, the additional circumstances which have conspired
to bring that class into being and have bolstered it must also be acknowledged. And
among some of their members – pursuing the classic middle-class goals of a higher edu-
cation, and having acquired the detached self-reﬂection that such an education can bring
– this acknowledgement has indeed taken place.
Self-reﬂection and critical citizenship
How far do congregants act on or embrace these pastors’ messages? Alternatively, in
what other ways does church membership embody their ‘new subjectivities’? ‘The
key to the new middle classes is the Bible churches’, was the assertion mentioned
earlier. This observation, made by a young woman – Kopano Twala – who was lecturing
in Sociology at the University of Johannesburg when I met her, combines personal
involvement with detached analysis. She and her partner, Sello Morake, could be var-
iously construed as members of those ‘classes’, and both belong to His People
Church. But despite being committed members, they have the kind of self-reﬂective
view that is not often conveyed in accounts of the ‘new middle classes’ and the
churches to which they belong. The analyses mentioned above – whether ‘sociologi-
cal/Weberian’ in tone (Bernstein & Rule 2011), pointing to the signiﬁcance of
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redistribution (Bähre 2011), or exploring ‘neoliberal citizenship’ and new hopes and
aspirational subjectivities (Comaroﬀ 2012) – can sound somewhat patronising. In outlin-
ing what roles the churches play for their adherents, such accounts seem to suggest
that members of the rank-and-ﬁle membership hail from a walk of life very diﬀerent
from that occupied by the analysts. For Kopano and Sello, however, committed involve-
ment combines with dispassionate observation to yield a subtle perspective that goes
beyond these outsider perspectives. Their insights – as they themselves acknowledge –
derive from an interplay between several factors. One is the conﬁdence arising from the
new subjectivities and value orientations that arise out of belonging to this church with
its ‘new middle class’ membership. Another, contradictorily, is their having grown up in
older, more established churches, which gave them the drive to become educated and
get ahead in life (see James 2015: 40–1). A third is the happy coincidence of having
come of age in South Africa’s new democracy when good jobs were newly available,
especially to those with the qualiﬁcations to ﬁt the role.
Not surprisingly given the predominantly Christian culture of South Africa, both of them
were brought up as members of more mainstream churches and hence neither has experi-
enced outright ‘conversion’ or a straightforward ‘break with the past’ (Meyer 2004). In the
case of Kopano, whose family had been stalwarts of the ‘old’ or ‘traditional’ black middle
class (see Cobley 1990; Kuper 1965; Mabandla 2013 & 2015), they had belonged to a main-
stream ‘mission church’ – the Methodist Church – for generations. She had nonetheless
been drawn to His People, ﬁnding that it oﬀered her something she previously lacked.
In Sello’s case, it was only in his parents’ generation that his family had experienced
upward class mobility. Paralleling this, but also reﬂecting other disagreements, his
father and mother had made a series of conversion/moves: from the older Pentecostal
Apostolic Faith Mission Church, very populous in rural areas of the former Transvaal, to
the new Word of Life Church founded by his father, and then eventually to a larger
church – the Assemblies of God.
Sello painted a vivid picture of the contrasts between his provincial upbringing and the
slick urban setting where he was living and working when I met him. His account made
clear the diﬀerences between what an upwardly mobile person might have aspired to
one generation back and what was achievable in the 2000s. While acknowledging the
full extent of the change undergone by his father, Sello also pointed to the subsequent
gap – between the class to which his father had aspired and that in which he, Sello,
had found himself.
His parents, as he told me, had themselves undergone considerable upward mobility –
not without some psychic dislocation –with Christian conviction playing an important role
in reshaping their value orientations and aspirations. They had lived near Bushbuckridge
on the border of the Kruger National Park, before moving to the then small and sleepy
provincial town of Nelspruit (which has since 1994 grown considerably to become the
capital of the new province of Mpumalanga):
My father came from a working-class family, but his conversion is what propelled him to
change. He is now a teacher of maths and science. He had a big desire to study, and went
to school. But once he was at school, it was seeing this singing done by the church
members that drew him – along with the message of hope and a better life. He was
looking for something better, but could not quite deﬁne it. The church became a vehicle.
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It was alongside his new-found motivation and professional status that Sello’s father’s reli-
gious leadership evolved, taking him from the Apostolic Faith Mission to found his own
Word of Life Church. Political disagreements resulted in his shifting once again, this
time joining his wife in the Assemblies of God:
When my father ﬁrst joined them the members were mostly domestics, working-class people,
even the groundsman was a pastor at the Afrikaans school in Nelspruit where we used to hold
the services. Now, with the inﬂuence of my father and other teacher/professionals the regional
leadership had to get a pastor who was more educated. Now, with black people moving into
cities, you’ll ﬁnd that the culture of these urban churches is very diﬀerent to that found in the
rural areas.
Sello’s account reveals a relatively gradual process, over at least a couple of generations,
that eventually led to his current situation. A smart and sophisticated young IT salesman
when I interviewed him, he was not yet satisﬁed with his achievements to date, and had
yet further ambitions – including starting his own business. But this sense of style and
orientation altering step-by-step across the generations belied Sello’s feeling that his
parents’ existing church aﬃliations, fervent and committed though they were, failed to
mirror or express his own new situation. It was this feeling of diﬀerence, and of future
aspiration, that had fuelled his move to His People, which he joined while at university:
‘I feel that this church speaks to me, to where I am, to where I want to be. I am the
person I want to be.’
When I asked him for further detail on how His People contrasted to the older, more
‘rural’ Pentecostal churches in which he grew up, his answer gave a self-reﬂective
insight into the complex modalities of rapid class mobility, and into conundrums concern-
ing those who one then ‘leaves behind’.
The diﬀerence is that, in a more traditional church, working-class people tend to set the aspira-
tions. It is hard for one to translate these into one’s own aspirations – you do not share things
with those around you. You are either trying to bring people up with you, or otherwise you are
talking down to them. It is about class aspiration.
He felt equally uncomfortable, however, about:
middle-class people who take up a sort of missionary role in relation to those of the working
class. They feel that they need to serve those in this lower class – not necessarily to ‘bring them
up’.
The ‘visions and goals’ of his new co-congregants, he felt, were:
All about importing their vision of society into all spheres – government, the corporate sector,
etc. Here, they can have a bigger impact as a church. Now, if you are in a rural area, such ideals
are rather too high-ﬂying. There it is issues of subsistence that concern them – they are at the
bottom of the hierarchy.
Spronk’s research on young middle-class Nairobeans shows some similarities. Her infor-
mants ‘were working their way up the social ladder through hard work, continuous edu-
cational pursuits, and manoeuvring within the job market’. Although most of them, unlike
Sello, were second-generation city-dwellers, the gap between them and less wealthy
people/relatives, especially those from rural areas, ‘has increased steadily over the last
decades’ (2014: 102). As she puts it:
10 D. JAMES
the distance between these young professionals and Kenyans outside the middle classes has
widened. Some of those interviewedmarvelled at the fact that they hadmore in common with
me (a fellow young professional) than with some of their relatives ‘in shacks’ (in the rural
areas). (Spronk 2014: 108)
Sello’s account reﬂects – as do those of Spronk’s informants – on whether a person who
has moved up through the ranks will regard himself as connected, and accountable, to
those who share his background, or whether he will feel more comfortable being ‘the
person [he wants] to be’. While it might seem to reﬂect an impetus similar to that dis-
cussed by Birgit Meyer (2004) and Linda van de Kamp (2012), in which young people
seek a disconnection from kinsmen while simultaneously seeking to belong within a
new group that shares these achievements and orientations, it is also a statement of indi-
viduality and choice that is characteristically middle-class.
When I talked to Kopano about similar matters, she gave further insight into the situ-
ation. In her case, what church membership and its associated counselling enabled was
to break away from family expectations that were themselves implanted in middle-class
ideals – but those of a previous generation. She told me she was coming under pressure
from her mother and other family members to go along an expected route. They wanted
her to complete the bursary-funded studies that she had begun in science, and were dis-
turbed by the idea that she might not complete the degree. The pastor counselled her in a
way that enabled her to counter these pressures, by emphasising the importance of
ﬁnding her own route, realising her own talents and building upon these rather than fol-
lowing an established path laid out by others. This individualist-sounding advice was what
had encouraged her in her decision to switch disciplines and pursue her studies in social
sciences and humanities.8
The discrepancy between such a focus on the aspirations of the individual and the fate
of those who are less fortunate is something to which – like some of the critical commen-
tators on these churches – she had given much thought. She had pondered long and hard
on the question of how neo-charismatic members of the new middle class square their
success with the failure of so many (see Spronk 2014: 108); and whether this inevitably
involves a retreat from their earlier tendency to engage more publically – and politically
– with issues of social inequalities. This kind of withdrawal, she said, is similarly mediated
by the notion of an individualised purpose, calling, or discovering of one’s own route.
In the early 1990s the church became involved in the struggle against apartheid. Even Rhema
opened up its doors to all at a time when the nature of politics and the economy was chan-
ging. It provided a perfect opportunity for people. Being in a context where the message cor-
responds to the broader situation, this oﬀers an explanation to people. But it also gives people
an explanation for gross inequality. If you’re able to earn R100,000 per month and others have
nothing, you feel there is a destiny and purpose. And so you don’t have to struggle to recon-
cile this with the existence of inequality. You’d feel guilty if you used it all yourself, but here
you are giving some of your money away. It is the church that uses it. The middle class are
removed from their own societies – or the societies to which they formerly belonged – and
are not aware of the extent of poverty and marginalisation out there, or of the scale of
injustice.
Having developed sophisticated sociological insights into her own situation and that of
the ‘new black middle class’ in general, she went on to reﬂect on some of the complex
relationships between the ideology these churches propagate and the actuality of their
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members’ situations. One of the things she found it diﬃcult to come to terms with was the
disconnect between the church’s attitudes towards gender relationships, on the one hand,
and the actuality of their members’ lives, on the other. Her account reveals the extensive
interventions made by churches in members’ lives – part of their welfare and outreach
activities – through a series of home study groups and counselling arrangements, as
well as by distributing advice and sermons on CDs. In line with the conservative-style
family values propagated by the US churches on which the South African ones model
themselves, these groups and sermons celebrate and try to propagate the idea of the sub-
missive religious wife, obedient to her husband. In parallel, they attribute many of society’s
ills to the absence of father ﬁgures in modern families, and provide intensive mentoring to
men as a means to counter this. The church endorses patriarchy in all its senses, she told
me, legitimating the idea that the man is the image of the Christian God. Women in the
church participate in and endorse this position, by taking their sons oﬀ to ‘men camps’,
for example. But, she said, much of the market, many of the people who consume
these CDs and partake of the advice, are – like her – professionals. ‘I try to be open
with my friends,’ she says, ‘challenging the women who are consuming all this stuﬀ on
CDs about how to be a prayerful wife.’
Her account put me in mind of the many women – business professionals, graduate
students, lecturers, and people in important government positions, as well as the more
modest rural schoolteachers – that I met in the course of my ﬁeldwork. These are
people who not only earn their own living and support their children, but are also, in
many cases, single or divorced; and ongoing and stable conjugal arrangements were in
the minority. The role of the churches in enabling professional women to pursue their
careers has been likewise noted by Maria Frahm-Arp (2010; see also Bochow & Van Dijk
2012). In light of this, it may well be that the eﬀorts of the church represent a rear-
guard action to stave oﬀ further such domestic struggle and schism, and restore the sanc-
tity of marriage. Doing so – in frank contradiction of the socioeconomic circumstances in
which these struggles arise – perhaps suggests a measure of desperation; but it is also
possible for value orientations to aﬀect material and social contexts, as Max Weber
([1905] 2002) suggested.
The real source of the new-found wealth enjoyed by some members of the new black
middle class was something on which Kopano’s critical self-reﬂection also dwelt. ‘There is a
coincidence,’ she said ‘in the Protestant ethic being preached among people where the
structural nature of the South African economy is advantaging entrepreneurs’.
The higher education system is more advantageous to black men and women than before.
Now, not many are turned away. There is funding available if you are black – government
loans and the like. People ﬁnd more and more opportunities, because of the transition –
and this dovetails with the church’s message of destiny, of calling. This somehow gives testi-
mony that what they have heard at church is true – that this is the real church. They are not
aware that the context is what is making this possible – especially during the Mbeki years.
During these years, policies were geared towards producing a black middle class, a big
white-collar sector. This was a key invention of Mbeki. All this coincided with the great
inﬂux of new churches in post-1994 South Africa.
Besides the members in the church who beneﬁted from active strategies to foster the
growth of this sector, many people in the church were working directly for the govern-
ment, writing speeches for ministers, and the like. They formed part of a larger
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phenomenon of class mobility in black society post-1994. In addition to being the beneﬁ-
ciaries of the particular strategy to enlarge the middle class that was one legacy of the
post-1999 Mbeki presidency, their story was also that of the ‘substantial upward mobility
of signiﬁcant segments of the ANC’s constituency’ (Southall 2012: 10), including not only a
‘party-state bourgeoisie’ but also a ‘middle class strongly dependent on the state’, which
he analyses as part of the close relationship between the broader black middle class and
that state (Southall 2012: 1).
Self-reﬂective congregants like Kopano and Sello were engaging in a paradoxical exer-
cise. They drew attention to the way church members’ class identities and new subjectiv-
ities were founded on state support but disinclined to acknowledge that support. Yet they
themselves, as church members, had considered such matters carefully and were provid-
ing insightful and plausible reasons as to why this should be so, and as to why the church
appeals to them. The broader literature on these churches in South Africa, as well as the
speeches by pastors analysed above, reveals that members and pastors do share a simi-
larly critical consciousness about the existence of the government’s class project – and
perhaps of its narrow remit. Making up for this, the churches are said to have ‘empowered’
more people on a more diversiﬁed and widespread basis than the black-empowerment
policy had done (Schlemmer 2008). Politicians interviewed by researchers in the CDE
project said it was felt that the government’s ‘entrepreneurial drive’ had beneﬁted only
a few, and that the churches needed to bring this down to grassroots level and explain
how those at the grassroots, too, might derive advantages from these government pro-
grammes (Bernstein & Rule 2011: 7). Pastor Matome’s cynical statements about the
dogs ﬁghting over crumbs in a feeding frenzy induced by ‘aﬃrmative action’, and his dis-
paragement of those aspects of worldly wealth that such an advantage can bring, revealed
a similarly critical stance.
Conclusion
Let us return to those forms of value orientation, and the potential to transform subjectiv-
ities, which are said to characterise the neo-charismatic churches more generally, and in
South Africa and Kenya in particular. The cases outlined above substantiate the claim
that these churches blur modernist-style boundaries between religion and the secular,
as one can see from Sello’s claim about ‘importing their vision of society into all
spheres – government, the corporate sector’. It is likewise true that they take charge of
responsibility for members’ welfare, education and the like (Comaroﬀ 2012) through
what Bähre (2011) terms a redistributive approach.
The churches’ ethos also dovetails with what, in the case of Kenya, Henrietta Moore,
terms ‘shifts in forms of subjectiﬁcation linked to emergent publics and new forms of soci-
ality’ (2011: 145) and what Spronk terms ‘modern self-perceptions’ (2014; 106). Young
people expressing their ‘middle classness’ in both settings have a nuanced self-awareness
of the way in which their new status separates them from those with fewer privileges and
less access to the beneﬁts of modernity. Being educated gives them the means to delib-
erate self-critically about the character of these privileges. While they tend to join churches
where other middle-class people congregate – Sello and Kopano felt in their comfort zone
as members of His People, and Spronk’s Kenyan informants as members of the Nairobi
chapel or the Baptist Church (2012: 101) – they are sometimes uncomfortably aware of
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how this distances them from their countrymen and thus ﬂies in the face of broader demo-
cratic initiatives. The churches’ transformative discourse alternately conceals and reveals
aspects of individual and group identity, respectively. It seems to spur and reaﬃrm pro-
cesses of change while providing individuals with the psychic means for self-reﬂection
about it and its shortcomings. It enables the emergence of a new language in which par-
ticipants can both articulate the aim for and the experience of success, on the one hand,
and cope with diﬃculties in achieving it, on the other. There is a coexistence of aspired-for
self-betterment with consolation for ongoing marginality (Comaroﬀ 2012; Martin, cited in
Bernstein & Rule 2011: 97–8). Going further, church membership can conceal the true
grounds on which self-improvement actually occurred, as Kopano complained was the
case with her fellow-congregants. But – given the insight imparted by higher education,
which many in this category have been acquiring – it can also enable the emergence of
critical consciousness and the possibility to reﬂect upon the nature of socioeconomic
causes and the extent of the social inequality that results.
In neither country has the rise and enrichment of the middle class been an ‘overnight
sensation’: rather, there has been a more gradual emergence of aﬄuence with its accom-
panying mentality privileging individualised advancement, respectability, and ethical self-
fashioning (Lentz 2016), over a number of generations (Wrong 2010: 127). In both cases,
earlier elites acquired their elevated positions as members of older churches. From
these, their successors departed: as a means not simply to detach themselves from
kinship and other social obligations (Meyer 2004) but also to assert their novel status, iden-
tity and value-orientation. And in neither country was there a predominance of purely
market-driven or neo-liberal arrangements, as Comaroﬀ (2012) claims for Africa more gen-
erally. In South Africa, the eventual emergence of the new class, accompanying political
liberation and democracy after 1994, owed itself not simply – indeed, not primarily – to
the impetus of purely market forces. It was a ‘middle class strongly dependent on the
state’: whether through employment in the civil service, the government’s explicit focus
on BEE, or the more notorious system of ‘tenderpreneurs’ (Southall 2012: 13 & 2016;
McNeill 2012). It is a class whose formation saw ‘neoliberal means interweave with and
facilitate redistributive ends’ (Hull & James 2012: 16; see Hart 2005; Seekings & Nattrass
2005) in diverse and complex ways. In the Kenyan case, the newly-emerging middle
class had its bedrock in state clientelism of a rather diﬀerent kind, with each successive
government oﬀering privileges to its ethnically-deﬁned followings (Wrong 2010: 52, 116
& 126). It was also reliant on social and kinship networks for support in times of insecurity
(Kroeker 2018). The accompanying subjectivities similarly combine neoliberal with redistri-
butive orientations.
Charismatic churches oﬀer commentary, in particular, on the thorny and irresolvable
question of increasing inequality that is so pervasive in both South Africa and Kenya, as
well as criticising the apparently mindless consumption of commodities by the ‘new
middle classes’. In both countries, beneﬁciaries of the political developments that have
made their newfound wealth possible ﬁnd church membership aﬀords them a more posi-
tive self-identity than the view, prevalent in the critical media and in some academic
accounts, that this new wealth is the outcome of rent-seeking, cronyism and corruption
(Southall 2012: 13; Wrong 2010). Church membership is a means for reﬂecting on, celebrat-
ing, and consolidating one’s own new status. It allows a certain distance from what would
otherwise be a daily confrontation with the realities faced by those who do not share that
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status. For these latter – the non-beneﬁciaries – or for the pastors who minister to them
without necessarily sharing their humbler position, a language is provided for disparaging
the world of salaries, BMWs, and pay-TV subscriptions. Transcending and repudiating the
world of the here and now will at some point bring abundant reward; but in the meantime,
members are enjoined to work hard and also to pay their tithes into funds that will enable
some redistribution. The sermons apparently aim to help congregants transcend ‘this
world’s ﬁnancial system’ but also to bring abundance that will be evident in the here
and now. At the same time they provide a powerful ‘this-world’ commentary on the para-
doxical ambiguities of class.
Notes
1. Dieter Neubert & Florian Stoll contest the usefulness of this category: claiming that ‘the
Kenyan middle stratum does not form a class. Instead, the divisive lines run along socio-cul-
tural dimensions’: they prefer to typify these as ‘middle stratum milieus’ (2018: 2).
2. Spronk indicates that there was much variation in the ways people entered the middle class
over the course of the 20th century: ‘diﬀerent ethnic groups had diﬀerential access to the
resources generated by the cash-crop economy, schooling, and migration to cities (Parkin
1978)’ (2014: 100).
3. Where analysts give attention to their tastes and aspirations, this has been mostly because of
an interest in using these for the sake of increased sales to this ‘market segment’ (Krige 2009;
Unilever Institute 2007).
4. While some informants sought anonymity, others were keen to be cited, and I have respected
their wishes.
5. Rhema Bible Church was started in Johannesburg in the 1980s by Pastor Ray McCauley after
he had trained as pastor in the church of the same name in the United States <https://en.
wikipedia.org/wiki/Ray_McCauley>; it is now known as Rhema North, and the Grace Bible
Church in Soweto, under Pastor Mosa Sono, is an oﬀshoot <http://gracebiblechurch.org.za/>
(see Frahm-Arp 2010: 93–109). The members of both number in the hundreds of thousands.
6. Their analysis was more charitable than that of some anthropologists of the region, who
despite recognising the sincerity of congregants’ belief that riches would be forthcoming fol-
lowing regular monetary contributions (Van Wyk 2014; see Zaloom 2016) have treated charis-
matic church members as being almost blinded by the ‘prosperity gospel’ to pastors’ habit of
disappearing with the money (Bähre 2011).
7. In the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God (UCKG), there was strong moral pressure to
tithe and a detailed pamphlet on how to calculate the amount: tithes and oﬀerings ‘did not
grant autonomy to local branches but went towards a central fund that maintained and
expanded the church’s entire network’ (Van Wyk 2014: 87).
8. For more on the ambiguities arising out of conﬂicts between individual choice and social obli-
gations see James (2015: 218–22) & Phumelele Ndumo (2011) for South Africa; and Lena
Kroeker (2018) for Kenya.
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